Reining in the Bulls with Michael Marx
Interview with Tzeporah Berman of Stand.earth
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Name: Tzeporah Berman
Current Title: International Program Director
Current Organization: Stand.earth
Title during campaign: Team Leader
Organization during campaign: Greenpeace Canada
Name of campaign: Great Bear Rainforest Campaign
Date(s) of campaign: early 1990's
Target companies/corporations: MacMillan Bloedel, Western Forest Products, Interfor

Summary: The Great Bear Rainforest is one of the largest intact old growth temperate rainforests in the world. In the 1990's the majority of the rainforest was slated to be roaded and clearcut logged. Our campaign used the power of customers of Canadian wood and paper products to stop logging in intact valleys and create space for a solutions process with the provincial government, logging companies and indigenous nations.

00:04 Michael Marx:
Tzeporah Berman, International Program Director for Stand.Earth. Thanks for agreeing to do this interview.

00:10 Tzeporah Berman:
I'm excited to be here.

00:12 MM:
I want to talk to you about the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, because I really consider that to be one of those seminal corporate campaigns in the last 30 years. What was your position and your organization at the time of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign?

00:32 TB:
Well, the Great Barrier Rainforest campaign lasted for many years. So in fact, I had different positions at different organizations. When I first started the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, I was with Greenpeace Canada and I was a forest campaigner. During the campaign, I got hired by Greenpeace International to be the team leader for the Great Bear Rainforest campaign internationally. And then I was a part of the Clayquot Rainforest Coalition which had started in Clayquot, it became Coastal Rainforest Coalition, and I was the Greenpeace representative on that.

01:08 TB:
But then we created Forest Ethics and I was the campaign director at Forest Ethics. So in all of those positions, I was one of the primary architects of the advocacy and campaign work. And I was one of the primary negotiators with companies and with government.

01:28 MM:
Great. What was the history in this situation on the British Columbia coast and the area that came to be known as the Great Bear Rainforest.

01:43 TB:
When we started the campaign in the early nineties, there were, of the original 354 intact old growth rainforest watersheds on the coast, there were 69 left. All of those 69 were slated to be eroded or logged within the next five to 10 years when we started the campaign. And a lot of people didn't even know about it because this region was only accessible by plane or by boat because there weren't roads into the Great Bear Rainforest.

02:19 TB:
It was intact rainforest. And the area on the maps at the time was referred to only as the mid-coast timber supply area.

02:30 TB:
And when we launched the campaign, we launched it and basically called it the Great Bear Rainforest. And, we did that because it’s hard to get people excited about saving the ‘mid-coast

timber supply area.' It might have been one of the most successful tactics we ever employed was that name change. But also, because the more we researched the area, the more we sat down and spoke with indigenous leaders and scientists, we realized how critical the bear population -- grizzly bears, black bears, the rare white Kermode bear -- was to the health of that ecosystem and to the rich cultural heritage of region.

03:16 TB:
And, I can remember sitting in a meeting room, actually sitting in a restaurant with one of those paper tablecloths on them, and it was me and Valerie Langer, and I think Karen Mohan and a couple other people from the campaign, Chris Hatch, and we were brainstorming. Could we call it the Rainforest Coast, Canada's wet Rainforest Coast, Canada's Wild Rainforest Coast, the Great Rainforest, and we were just crossing all of these, and I think Karen still has the tablecloth crossing out all these names. And then someone said, we have to have 'bear' in it. Everyone who we're talking to says one of the reasons these trees are so big is because of the bears and because the bears are eating salmon from the stream and they're bringing those nutrients into the forest floor. And, then the trees are growing. And that's part of why they're so big. And it's also why we need to protect such big areas because the areas that are necessary for a bear to survive is an indicator of what is necessary for the health of an ecosystem.

04:30 TB:
So we were learning so much from the lens of the bear. Anyways, over the period of that lunch, someone came up with Great Bear Rainforest and we drew a circle around it. And then a couple of weeks later in the Greenpeace office, we put up a map of the coast and we identified every valley that was still intact. And you could see that it was basically a big green circle on the west coast of Canada. And we took a marker and drew a big circle around the entire thing, all 69 valleys. And we said, we don't have time, we don't have time to run campaigns valley by valley anymore. Which is how they'd been run. The Stein Valley, the Walbran Valley, the Carmanah Valley, even a whole sound like Blackwood Sound. All of this whole coast is slated in the next five to 10 years, and every campaign takes five to 10 years. So we just drew a big green circle around what was left on the whole west coast of Canada. We called it the Great Bear Rainforest.

05:24 MM:
Wow. And I agree with you. I think that name certainly dramatically shifted even the way people perceived its importance.

05:38 TB:
The visual aspect of it. You hear rainforest, you hear bears, you hear great. It's like it triggers something in you, it triggers a picture and an emotion. And that was really critical for what we were trying to do, which was, you know, create a debate and a conversation over a place no one had ever heard of before.

06:00 MM:
You alluded to some names early on that were involved on the table in drawing this out. I recall that there were three real major entities. There was the coalition of the Canadian Groups. There was a coalition of more international groups, and then there was the First Nations alliances. The Canadian groups -- do you remember the name of that coalition and who were some of the core groups in it?

06:36 TB:
We created a project called the Rainforest Solutions Project (RSP). And that was basically the groups that were trying to craft a solutions pathway with the government and industry and indigenous nations. And that was Sierra Club Greenpeace and then there were groups in and out who supported. I would say probably in Canada, it was primarily Sierra Club Greenpeace and Forest Ethics, which became Stand.Earth. But then there was also Markets Initiative, which is now called Canopy in the later years. They came in and out. Friends of Clayquot Sound, they came in and out. We consulted a number of other organizations, but it was really those three: Stand.Earth which was Forest Ethics, Sierra Club, and Greenpeace that did the majority of the work to create the RSP.

07:31 MM:
In the original US Coalition, I think the Coastal Rainforest Coalition, who were the core groups in that, and briefly what was their role?

07:43 TB:
That was across border coalition. So that was Forest Ethics, well before it was Forest Ethics. So that was Friends of Clayquot Sound, Greenpeace, Sierra Club -- both on both sides of the border -- Rainforest Action Network and NRDC. I don't think I'm forgetting anyone.

08:06 MM:
And just briefly, they had different roles. For example, what was Rainforest Action Network's role in those early days of the campaign?

08:17 TB:
The roles evolved over time as the campaign evolved, but certainly the Canadian groups had more of a role in meeting with the indigenous nations, meeting with the government, meeting with the industry, taking people to the region, meeting with local communities, trying to develop solutions, et cetera. The US groups had more of a role of talking to the marketplace, and running campaigns against customers to create financial leverage for those discussions and negotiations in Canada.

08:55 TB:
I remember Rainforest to Action Network took on a number of markets initiatives. The first one being a broad sweep of sending out letters to every customer that we could figure out. And coordinating that initial markets outreach. As the markets outreach and the customer

campaigns became more sophisticated and larger, the groups kind of divided up the sector that they were talking to or running campaigns on.

09:30 TB:
Rainforest Action Network took solid wood and they ran an incredible campaign, a very well-known campaign against Home Depot, which not only turned Home Depot into committing to not buy from the Great Bear Rainforest. And, we were able to use Home Depot's, the leverage of those buying commitments into negotiations for a moratorium in Canada. But also during those negotiations, RAN realized of course, that they couldn't just say to Home Depot "don't buy from the Great Bear Rainforest. Home Depot would increase, for example, old growth or primary Forest from the Amazon. And so that campaign was one of the first campaigns where we saw the widening of the demand set and the call for no old growth logging or purchasing globally, which also segued into the later conversations around the Forest Stewardship Council. So RAN was on Home Depot. The coalition lead staff at one point was Todd Paglia, who's now the executive director of Stand.Earth, was on paper and specifically office paper. And NRDC, my memory was NRDC was doing magazines because I remember Liz Barrett Brown meeting with Time Magazine and some other magazines. And Greenpeace was doing Europe customers in Europe and Japan primarily.

11:07 MM:
Okay, good. So there's the Canadian Coalition. Then, there's the International Coalition of First Nations. How were they organized and who were some of the First Nations on the Coastal First Nations that were most engaged in the campaign and their role?

11:30 TB:
Fairly early on in the discussions, indigenous nations organized themselves in the Coastal First Nations, which is kind of an association of indigenous nations up and down the coast who hired shared staff and strategized together on issues of logging and carbon markets and economic diversification, et cetera. And so, RSP, Rainforest Solutions Project would meet with Coastal First Nations to better understand their perspectives, their opinions, what they wanted to see happen, et cetera, and try and coordinate our approaches to government and industry so that we could support the indigenous demands and perspectives. And, obviously together we were more powerful than apart. That was difficult because the companies were promising a lot of things. Trying to get indigenous nations to support logging if they built schools, if they invested money in the community, et cetera. And so it was a very, very difficult time.

12:44 TB:
And our relationships as environmental groups with First Nations we're often rocky in my opinion, because indigenous leadership were put in an untenable position by government and industry and kind of wedged in without the support to make their own decisions. So if an indigenous nation was to come out and say, well, we want all of the old growth protected, then they were subject to attacks in their own community, then it was almost like the onus was on them for destroying these jobs, but they didn't have the resources to put in job transition plans or economic diversification plans for the region.

13:36 TB:
And then in some ways, 30 years later, that hasn't changed. The government continues to say they support indigenous rights and reconciliation and push indigenous groups to make the decisions. But it's only easy to make the decision to continue to allow industrial extraction because that's what's bringing short-term economic revenue and jobs into your community. So it was the indigenous leadership that had certainly the hardest, in some ways untenable, position kind of squished between environmental interests and the government.

14:16 MM:
So stepping back, with those three entities, what was the overall kind of strategic drivers or thinking for the campaign? Because I know that one of the things you mentioned -- Home Depot, I imagine there was a customer component to it with Greenpeace and Rainforest Action Network, concentrating on those companies and, like NRDC concentrating on publishers. Was there kind of a theory of change? A strategic driver?

14:53 TB:
For decades there had been scientific research showing that endangered seabirds, for example, depended on the old growth. That old growth, clear cut logging was going to devastate wild rivers, salmon populations, et cetera. The information had been amassed and the government and industry were ignoring it. Then there were blockades and protests, thousands of people marching in the streets in Vancouver, tens of thousands of people on blockades and arrested.

15:25 TB:
And still the logging continued. So we decided to follow the money and to find out if the government wasn't going to listen to the people. Because the polling showed that the majority of the people supported protection of old growth. And if we were making as much noise as we could and getting on the front page of newspapers, et cetera, and still the logging continued, what would they (the government) listen to? And our analysis was that the government was listening to the companies. That the companies were very powerful. The logging companies at that time, historically were in a lot of ways like the fossil fuel companies now, the wealthiest companies, the companies with the most access to government, they had the greatest influence on the government. So the government's listening to the companies and the companies are listening to their customers. That's what they care about. They need access to markets, they need growing markets because their annual level cut was growing. They need to listen to their customers.

16:29 TB:
And so we decided to go directly with our concerns to the customers, that by getting companies to cancel their contracts and say they wouldn't buy unless old growth was protected and unless logging practices changed, then it wasn't just us trying to be in there negotiating with the government and industry. It was us with the weight of the customers, and we were right. That theory of change worked, we were able to amass significant financial power within the first two years of the campaign. We had about $30 million annually of contract cancellations. And, that is

what forced the government and industry to the table. But change takes time. So the other tactics, the protests in front of customers, the protests on shipments of old growth forests coming out of British Columbia, the protests at Canadian consulates around the world. I wouldn't say those weren't necessary. Those were necessary in order to keep the issue at the top of the agenda. And also to create the problem that customers had to address. Because when you initially approach customers in almost every (case), whether I was talking to Scott Paper in the UK or Home Depot in California, the conversation usually went the same way.

17:59 TB:
It was “that can't be happening. We're told we're getting sustainably harvested wood, and most of it's not old growth.” Well, here's the data, here's the photos, it's all old growth and it's not sustainably harvested. It's clear cut. “Oh, well then you should talk to your government. This has nothing to do with us. We just buy the wood.” And that was the same conversation with every single customer. And so in order to motivate those customers to act, we had to be very public because they needed to know there would be consequences from their customers if they didn't act.

18:33 TB:
So the theory of change was we create protests in front of Home Depot stores or news articles about how Home Depot or Scott Paper are their customers and destroying these rainforests. And that affects their reputational capital. They start worrying about their customers. They go back to MacMillan Bloedel or Western Forest Products or Interfor and say, “you have to change your practices or we can't keep buying from you.” MacMillan Bloedel goes back to the government and says, “we have a problem, we're losing customers.” And then the government and the industry come to us and negotiate an agreement. And in fact, it's one of the rare campaigns in 30 years that I've run where that is the exact chain of events that worked.

19:20 MM:
Were there moments where there were real milestones in terms of advancing this towards some type of negotiations? I mean, for example, it sounds like there are protests against a number of companies, a Home Depot for example, publishers, were there certain moments when they made commitments or when they stepped up or they responded that really moved the campaign closer to negotiations and some type of an agreement?

19:58 TB:
Yeah. Two meetings come to mind. One was in Belgium. I was invited to present to VDP-V-V-Z, which was one of the largest paper associations in Germany and Europe. And they didn't tell us who else was going to be at the meeting. They wouldn't tell us. And I remember walking into the room and I brought with me a couple of the chiefs from the Nuxalk (pronounced “New Hawk”) nation which they were not happy about. And, in the room was the chief forester of the province, Larry Peterson, as well as vice presidents of several of the logging companies. And I remember thinking, we have to fly all the way to Belgium just to meet with each other. Because at this point we weren't in negotiations yet. We had been asking for meetings. They'd been

refusing, they were running a campaign at home about us calling us eco terrorists and calling us, saying we were trying to destroy the province.

21:12 TB:
And you know, we only talked through the media. We weren't actually meeting at that point. And, at that meeting, they presented about how the logging is sustainable and what we're saying isn't true and et cetera, et cetera. And then we presented. And, I remember they asked us all to leave the room, VDP-V-V-Z, which was really uncomfortable because we're all standing in the hallway then for a minute.

21:39 TB:
And then we file back into the room. And the representative from VDP-VVZ, leaned back in his chair and he said, we don't want any part of this. We cannot in good conscience contribute to the destruction of some of the world's last primary forests. I mean, you remember, Europe doesn't have hardly any primary forests left. So they were so horrified, thousand year old trees being made into paper. And it is not our job to mediate between all of you. So either what's left of the intact forest are protected as the environmental groups have proposed and you stop logging them or we're not purchasing from Canada anymore. And the room just, you could hear, there was the first ever like very solid, clear. And this wasn't one company. This was recommending to all of our members in VDPVVZ.

22:37 TB:
And, I just remember that chief forester was so furious at me. It was funny when you're going through something like that, you're like, did that just happen? Did he actually say, what does that exactly mean? And then I just saw the horror on all. Like, they just didn't expect it. I mean, here I was walking into the room, a whatever, 28-year-old, you know, woman and with a chief of the Nuxalk, that's a hereditary chief, not an even elected chief. And they were so used to having power and having people listen to them that they had no expectation that that was how that meeting was going to go. A couple years later, I remember a big meeting with multiple government entities, multiple First Nations, multiple companies all around the table. And we were discussing making the moratorium permanent. Maybe this was closer to 2000, 2001. And in the meeting, Valerie passed me a note that said "it's official, Home Depot just canceled its contract." And Home Depot's contract was worth, I don't even remember now, tens and tens of millions of dollars.

24:05 TB:
And so I was able to announce in the meeting, "this is the beginning, not the end. You either commit to… The moratorium isn't not enough. We need protection, we need new forest practices. And, until that happens, these companies are not going to buy from the coast. And in fact, Home Depot just put out a press release saying they have a new policy, they will not buy from British Columbia." And, the room went crazy. And, that was a complete turning point in the discussion. And it was less than a year later when we got the first legislation passed to protect the intact forests.

24:44 MM:
I want to back up just a little bit between what happened after those announcements and before the legislation, you went into negotiations or a team went into the negotiations. I think those negotiations would be really interesting for people to just get a little bit of an insight into how they evolved. Who represented the companies, who represented the NGOs, the advocacy groups in it, and was it mediated? How did it evolve?

25:18 TB:
The negotiations were mediated from very early on by a man named Daniel Johnston from Pacific Resolutions, I think his company was called. And, Dan is brilliant. He's very, very good. And, I honestly don't think we would've reached agreements if he hadn't been so committed to starting from a place in which we found common values. And that was really important. I very much remember the first meeting where we sat down with the companies and we say our positions and they say their positions and then someone starts yelling and then someone else starts yelling and then the meeting's over. And that replayed, I don't know, for a long time. And then Dan was brought in and the first meeting we went to, I remember it was in the MacMillan Bloedel office. So it was Linda Cody from MacMillan Bloedel, it was Bill Dumont from Western Forest products, Rick Silko from Interfor, me, Marin Smith from who was Sierra Club at the time, and I think it was Karen Mahan, it was Greenpeace at the time. And I must have been representing the coalition or Forest Ethics.

26:41 TB:
So there's three young women, mostly men on the other side of the table. And that year we had started doing trainings together through an organization called the Hollyhock Leadership Institute and trainings on leadership, trainings on negotiations, trainings on values-based communication and nonviolent communication and things like that. The campaign had become so popular that this organization, the Hollyhock Leadership Institute or Retreat Center had contacted us and said, “We'll pay for you, you guys, you're doing hero's work. We'll pay for you all to come here. We'll pay for your trainings, your yoga, you need support.” Which was a funny story in and of itself because I can remember getting the letter thinking, are these people nuts? We don't have time for this. But eventually they convinced us to come there and it really changed who we were. There's a funny story. I remember walking into that meeting and it was either Karen or Marin passed me a little note that said, don't forget to breathe, because we'd been doing these meditation trainings and really, really critical actually. So the combination of the shared experience on our side of remembering to breathe or remembering to center ourselves, not just to respond, but to listen, you know, all these trainings we've been having. And then Dan Johnson started that meeting by saying, we're going to do some exercises to find common values.

28:17 TB:
And we thought, oh my God, we don't have time for this. This is ridiculous. But in fact, those conversations, while they took time, they helped us see people and not just positions. They helped create a conversation. And those people became the movers and shakers within those huge companies advocating change in forest practices, participation in the science panel and

the ecosystem-based management processes that we eventually created for the type of logging that should be happening on the coast. Like those people became the change makers. And I think it was in part because we all stopped seeing each other as the enemy through that process.

29:03 TB:
I can remember a conversation with Bill Dumont, or maybe it was Bill Cafferata from MacMillan Bloedel, where he said, you know, I don't get up in the morning saying, how can I destroy more forests? Like I became a forester because I love forests. And it was just this kind of little outburst, but I never forgot that sentence. I was like, oh, you did. And then I remember saying to him, well look, I have family that works in the forest industry. I don't get up in the morning and go, how many jobs can I destroy? And well, so what do you value? Like these conversations about values and common ground were absolutely critical to trying to close the gap in the positions.

29:47 MM:
It sounds like the process kind of evolved from one of conflict into this medium ground of commonality. And then I assume it moved into more a problem-solving stage, did it or not?

30:04 TB:
It's too easy Michael to say that it is in those stages. I've had so many interviewers say to me, so you went from blockades to boycotts to boardrooms and solutions. It doesn't work like that. Social change isn't linear. If you don't still have the conflict going on while you're in the boardroom, you will get nothing, right. Those solutions processes take a long time. And actually the biggest conflicts happened when we were in that process because we knew each other, you know, as the negotiations go on into several years, you're entering a meeting with Linda, how's the baby? How you doing? Oh, I heard you had the flu. You know, you're people and you have a people relationship. But at the same time, we're running campaigns and she's taking it personally and she's angry.

30:59 TB:
Some of the hardest conversations I ever had were people who I actually liked a little bit at this point. At least I understood them better. And they were like, how could you be swinging off our building in San Francisco and we said, we would do this, but you still, that contract still got canceled. And you know, and they were so angry about it, which I could totally understand. So their perspective was we have to stop and then we would create solutions.

31:29 TB:
And I would say, okay, well then you stop, we'll stop the campaign if you've stopped all the logging. And then we can all just sit with all the time in the world to create solutions. But as long as you are still logging, we are going to continue the campaign because that's the only reason you're sitting here talking to me. And it's a big mistake that a lot of campaigns make is to stop the outside campaign to go into solutions. And in fact, that's what happened in the Boreal Forest in Canada. And then we didn't get any good agreements out of it, because the urgency

goes away, the pressure goes away, and then your power reverts back to the power of the status quo, which is not the change makers.

32:13 MM:
Yeah, I remember one of the principles we were always taught in these corporate campaigns and other campaigns is never stop campaigning just because you're talking.

32:24 TB:
Exactly. And, that's very hard to do.

32:28 MM:
It’s very hard to do because you really have reached a point where there is some kind of problem-solving discussions. You think you've accomplished something in that you're talking together, but in fact, it's not over. It's far from over at that point. So, your point's very well taken. What was the agreement. After this process of the negotiations, what was the final agreement, or at least the agreement that came out of that process?

33:00 TB:
We reached an agreement for permanent protection of the intact valleys on the coast. And outside of those intact valleys, we would co-develop a new way of logging, ecosystem-based management and that respected the--how did we put it--respected first and foremost the ecological functions of the existing old growth forest. So the framework was that some logging would be allowed, but it had to maintain the integrity and ecological functions of the existing old growth forest. And so previously logging plans had been designed around what is the maximum you can take out because that was what they were required to do to maximize profits. And it was a volume-based profit system. And so, what we agreed to is to using shared scientific analysis, create a new way of land use planning and logging called ecosystem-based management that where the priority, the first priority would be to maintain healthy functions of the existing ecosystem or to replicate them in already damaged areas through remediation.

34:37 TB:
And secondly, we agreed to jointly create a financing initiative, a coast financing initiative in order to support indigenous communities and other local impacted communities to ensure economic diversification in the region. And we agreed to raise $120 million to start that fund with the government raising a third, industry raising a third and NGOs raising a third. I'm pretty sure that's how that went. Those are the bare bones of the early agreements. And once there was protection in place for the intact valleys and the ecosystem-based management process had begun, then we stopped the markets campaign.

35:38 MM:
Okay. So when you look back on this and also just what's happened since then, how did this campaign help build the forest protection movement? And also given the markets campaign, the strategy of focusing on customers, which was relatively new, if not very new in terms of corporate campaigns, did that also start to play more of a role in the subsequent campaigns?

36:15 TB:
Certainly the Great Bear Rainforest campaign increased the power and reputational capital of forest campaigns all over the world because we showed that it was possible to take on a wealthy government and a wealthy industry and force them to completely change their practices in land use plan. And, that it was possible to do that without destroying the economy. That you could create ecosystem-based management, economic diversification, financing for conservation. You know, it was the beginning of a lot of those conversations. And, I think that was critical as a model for the power and reputation of forest campaigns all over the world. I think we pioneered supply chain research, chain of custody research and financial corporate campaigns bringing in the agency of the consumer and the customer, forcing them to acknowledge their responsibility.

37:26 TB:
Back then that didn't exist, right? Most of them didn't even have policies, paper companies or lumber companies, about where they buy from. If they did have policies, they were very weak and they certainly didn't think that they could have an influence in, or didn't want to try and have an influence in a region. And today, of course, we see customer campaigns all over the world. It's, you know, Greenpeace campaigning against Kit Kat for using palm oil from Indonesia. There's many corporate campaigns now from all over the world that use that theory of change and that strategy. All of that said, I think it is also fair to say that we weakened civil society movements on forest protection. And that's a hard thing to say as a campaigner, but in the early nineties you saw some of the biggest protests and civil disobedience and that was super accessible.

38:37 TB:
You didn't have to be an expert, you didn't have to be a supply chain researcher. You didn't have to have a job with Greenpeace or Sierra Club. You felt like it was your movement and you were a part of it and thousands of people participated in it. And when the government didn't respond to it, we kind of left it behind and we focused on the markets and the finance and then that worked. So we just kept following that. That's good. And we made some change using that, but we didn't take care to continue to grow and feed the public movement and mobilization.

39:17 TB:
And, that kind of took agency away from individuals. And I think it weakened the environmental movement overall when the organizing started happening around pipeline campaigns in North America, and again, on old growth just in the last five years, it was like having to start from scratch. You know, it wasn't like you could just call up a group and say, Hey, can you send out an email? Can you get people to come to this rally? It was hard, hard work because it was almost like that muscle had atrophied, that civil society engagement muscle had atrophied and we had contributed to environmentalism becoming more elite and more professional. And I think that that's an important reckoning as we look at different theories of change.

40:18 TB:
Everyone wants a silver bullet, the one thing that's going to work. But I think what I've seen over 30 years is that you need to have multiple tools in your tool belt and you never want to make the tent smaller, always want to make the tent bigger. And those of us who have full-time jobs who get to do this, who get to work all day on the things that keep us up at night, we have a responsibility to create engagement pathways for other people who care.

40:47 MM:
That seems like a perfect place to end the interview. Tzeporah Berman, International campaign.

40:56 TB:
So many other stories about the Great Bear Rainforest, though, I want to tell you so many other stories.

41:03 MM:
And, actually I think it might call for an entire other interview because it sounds like it's something that's just continued to go on and so many lessons learned from even the post campaign phase of this whole process.

41:22 TB:
So many, oh wait, can I tell you one other quick story? Yeah. Because you have to have this in.

41:27 MM:
I'd love it.

41:31 TB:
When we were campaigning in Germany to try and get customers in Europe to stop buying from the Great Bear Rainforest, one of the German activists from Greenpeace had this idea, we need a great bear. You're calling it the Great Bear Rainforest, we need a great bear. And I was like, what do you mean? He goes, let's build a great bear. And we use that as a protest in front of this big customer meeting that the BC government's going to be holding in Germany. And so, okay, let's build a great bear. So they commissioned a 60 foot inflatable bear, and they invited me and Chief Ed Moody from the Nuxalk to come to Germany to protest with them in front of this big customer meeting where the premier was meeting with the customers and logging companies. And so there we are in Germany, we're starting to inflate this bear and we see all the men in suits, you know, walking into the meeting and Chief Ed Moody goes out with his, you know, traditional dress and everything.

42:42 TB:
And then you see their faces pale, “Oh no, chief and their traditional dress, we've got to walk right by them” you know, and they go into the meeting. Meanwhile, I'm trying to inflate a 60 foot inflatable bear in the middle of a street and we can't get it up. Finally it starts going up and we have this crowd of people and I realize they're staring at the bear's butt that we've blown

the bear up the wrong way around. And we're trying to turn it around, but try and turn around a 60 foot inflatable bear!

43:13 TB:
Very difficult. We ended up having to leave it as it was. And anyways, we have the protest. A couple weeks later I'm talking to one of the company representatives who was in that meeting and he goes, “And how you get the bear to stare right into the meeting, I don't know, but we just kept saying, you're a magician, Tzeporah Berman.” And I was like, what do you mean? And he said, well, we were on the 25th floor of this building and we're in this huge glass boardroom and we're getting the presentation about how we should keep buying from these companies and how everything's fine.

43:47 TB:
And all of a sudden in front of the window, are these two eyes looking into the meeting. And, he says, “so I said to the company, but the world is watching us and we can't keep buying these products.” And it was all because the bear was facing the wrong way with the eyes looking into the meeting. Anyways, lots of great stories.

44:12 MM:
So much of winning is what we control and what we don't control. That works for us again. That's reminded me just why this is considered to be one of the real seminal corporate forest campaigns, in the last 30 years. And so Tzeporah Berman, International Campaign Director for Stand.Earth, thank you. I really appreciate you taking the time for this interview.

44:42 TB:
Thank you.